The Roy-Lenin Debate on Colonial Policy: a New Interpretation JOHN P. HAITHCOX B EFORE the opening of the Second World Congress of the Communist International (July ig-August 7, I920) [which met on the first day in Petrograd but subsequently in Moscow], Lenin prepared a draft thesis on the national and colonial question. M. N. Roy, a young Bengali attending his first international Communist gathering, eagerly responded to Lenin's request for criticisms. As a result, Lenin invited him to write an alternative thesis. Both theses were modified as a result of discussions within the National and Colonial Commission, and both were subsequently adopted by the Congress. After his encounter with Lenin, Roy rose rapidly in the Comintern hierarchy. In I922 he was elected a candidate member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), and a full voting member in I924. He became a member of the Presidium in I924. It was in the year I926, however, that Roy attained the peak of his influence in the Comintern. In February of that year he was appointed to the editorial staff of the Communist International,1 and in the following December he was reelected to the Presidium and joined the Political Secretariat of the ECCI.2 At the time of the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI (November I2-D'ecember i6, I926), Roy became Secretary of the Chinese Commission, a post he held jointly with Petrov, and a member of the Agrarian Commission.3 The Plenum, convened for the purpose of considering the China problem, adopted a thesis on the question and Roy was sent to China as a representative of the Comintern to carry it out. Following the events in China in I927, Roy's influence declined precipitately, though he was not formally expelled until December, i929.
Three notable attempts have been made to assess the influence of M. N. Roy in the formulation of the colonial policy of the Comintern and the part he played in Soviet relations with the Chinese Communist Party. In both these respects, a number of discrepancies exist between North and Eudin's M. N. Roy's Mission to China on the The author is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. He is currently (I963-64) a Carnegie Teaching Fellow with the Committee on Southern Asian Studies at the University of Chicago. The present paper was written while the author, with the support of a Ford Foundation Foreign Area Training Fellowship, was engaged on a larger study on "Nationalism, Communism and Social Mobilization: Royist Tactics in India, 1930-1947 ." However the opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the Ford Foundation. one hand, and Whiting's Soviet Policies in China I9I7-I924 and Overstreet and Windmiller's Communism in India on the other.4
North's book, unlike the other two, focuses exclusively on Roy. As a consequence his assessment is based on a more careful analysis of the relevant documents, and is, incidentally, the most complimentary to Roy. However he leaves the reader with the impression, which is open to question, that Roy's China episode was the principal cause of his expulsion from the Comintern. Whiting adopts an opposite point of view. Because of an error of interpretation, he seriously underestimates the significance of Roy's contribution to the Comintern's colonial policy. The wide acceptance of the book as an authoritative work in its field serves to magnify the error. Overstreet and Windmiller, for example, repeating the error, come to a similar conclusion. Furthermore, speculating on the basis of highly inconclusive evidence, they strongly intimate that Roy's challenge to Lenin's colonial thesis was prompted by considerations of self-aggrandizement or by emotional reactions. This paper does not attempt to support North's view that "Roy ranks with Lenin and Mao Tse-tung in the development of fundamental Communist policy for the underdeveloped ... areas of the globe."5 That would require a careful appraisal of Roy's contribution to Comintern activities throughout the period I920-i927, whereas the present work is confined largely to Roy's participation in the Second Comintern Congress. However, it is maintained that Roy played a highly significant role in the formulation of Comintern policy on the national and colonial question.
Though there were several points of disagreement between Lenin's and Roy's original draft theses on the national and colonial question, the main issue revolved around Lenin's assertion that Communist parties in all colonial areas must assist "bourgeois-democratic liberation" movements.6 In his draft theses and in discussions with the National and Colonial Commission, Roy opposed alliances with certain bourgeois-democratic movements-it was evident that he had the Indian National Congress in mind-which might desert to the imperialist camp in a revolutionary situation. According to official Russian newspaper summaries, Roy argued that in countries such as India, which are characterized by the absence of "reliable" nationalist movements, the Comintern, rather than supporting such movements, should "assist exclusively the institution and development of the communist movement . . ." and the indigenous Communist parties, or groups, avoiding entanglements with these potentially reactionary bourgeois-nationalist leaders, should "devote themselves exclusively to the organisation of the broad popular masses for the struggle for the class interests of the latter."7 It is evident that Roy was making a distinction between two different types of bourgeois-democratic nationalist movements-the precise nature of which will be explained below-with only one of which were alliances for the Communists practical. As a result of Roy's criticisms, Lenin's theses on the national were modified; the Comintern was counseled to support "re of liberation" rather than "bourgeois-democratic liberation In attempting to evaluate Roy's influence on the formula theses, Whiting concludes that the verbal substitution, not the meaning of the sentence.9 In support, he quotes from Comintern Congress on the deliberations of the National a that "there is not the s.lightest doubt that every national m bourgeois-democratic movement, for the bulk of the popul tries are peasants, who represent bourgeois-capitalist relations.
is seconded by Overstreet and Windmiller. Citing the identi that "it was clear to Lenin's mind the change was more apparen But Whiting has failed to quote the entire passage, and th the distinction which Roy was trying to make, evidently w success, was not between nationalist and bourgeois-democra tween different types of bourgeois-democratic movements. nationalist movements can only be bourgeois-democratic in to the Congress: "it was argued that if we speak about th movement all distinction between reformist and revolution obliterated; whereas in recent times this distinction has been f in the backward and colonial countries."12 Elaborating on explained that "very often, even in the majority of cases perhap of the oppressed countries does support the national movem works in harmony with the imperialist bourgeoisie, i.e., it join again all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes In the Commission this was proved irrefutably, and we came to only correct thing was to take this distinction into consideration substitute the term "nationalist-revolutionary" for the term "bo meaning of this change is that we Communists should, and will, tion movements in the colonial countries only when these mov tionary, when the representatives of the movements do not hi organising the peasants and the broad masses of the exploited in Reformist parties already exist in colonial countries.... The abov has now been drawn in all these theses, and I think that, thanks t has been formulated much more precisely.
It is important to note that the theses constituted Lenin's firs in a systematic manner his ideas on the problems of revolu Lenin attributed to Roy a larger role in the shaping of his thou than have some subsequent scholars.
Whiting claims that in his gress, Roy had inserted "a s Lenin's point of cooperation w "for the overthrow of foreig the colonies, the cooperation useful."14 But Whiting has tionary." The statement is en alist movements of truly revolutionary potential and those of a merely reformist nature.
Much confusion has arisen among practicing Communists and disinterested scholars alike over the interpretation of thes.e theses because of a failure to keep in mind the distinctions which were evolved at the Second Comintern Congress between different categories of the bourgeoisie-(a) feudal remnants and militarists, (b) compradores, (c) national bourgeoisie, and (d) petty-bourgeoisie." The first two groups were considered to be unambiguously reactionary, but it was believed that the petty-bourgeoisie, though fickle, could be induced to support the proletarian cause if given a firm lead. The question of the "reliability" of the national bourgeoisie was, however, a much more difficult matter. Lenin felt that they could be a progressive force, particularly in the early stages of the nationalist movement when anti-imperialist fervor was strong, but that continued alliance with them, once their revolutionary potential had been exhausted, would be self-defeating.
But how to determine the point at which this crucial stage has been reachedthe point at which Communist tactics must abruptly change from "revolution from above" to "revolution from below"? Though never clearly stated, an analysis of the theses and debates of the Second Congress reveals that this would depend on three factors: the class structure, the stage of development of the nationalist movement, and the relative strength of the bourgeois and proletarian forces within the country in question.
In accordance with the first two considerations, continued support of a bourgeoisnationalist movement would be considered inadvisable should bourgeois sub-groups, deemed reactionary, capture its leadership or should the national bourgeoisie, sensing impending victory over the imperialists, begin to panic at the prospect of unleashing class antagonisms. The former situation occurred in China in I926-i927, when feudal remnants and militarists gained predominant influence over the direction of the nationalist movement. Roy held out the latter prospect for India. In either case, the national movement would cease to be revolutionary and lapse into reformism. To illustrate the third factor, it would obviously be folly to continue to subordinate the interests of the proletariat to those of the bourgeoisie should the former become sufficiently strong to capture the leadership of the movement for itself.
Though Lenin and Roy agreed on the principle of s.upporting "revolutionary movements of liberation" or "bourgeois-national revolutionary elements," they differed markedly in their analysis of the Indian situation with respect to the class structure of the leadership of the Indian National Congress, and the relative strength of class forces within India.
The first disagreement centered on the role of Gandhi. Lenin believed that as a leader of a mass movement Gandhi was a revolutionary. Roy maintained that "as a religious and cultural revivalist, he was bound to be reactionary socially, however revolutionary he might appear politically,"16 and, in support, he cited Plekhanov's similar judgment of Russian Populist and Socialist Revolutionary Movements, which Roy felt corresponded with Gandhiism in that, believing in the special genius of the Slavic race, they had denounced capitalism as a Western vice anid championed a return to the village and the revival of the "Mirs."
In his analysis of class forces, Roy greatly exaggerated both the numerical and ideological strength of the Indian proletariat. Estimating that India possessed thirtyseven million landless peasants and five million proletariat, he reported to the Congress that, although the nationalist movement rested for the most part on middle classes, the proletarian masses would shortly blaze their own revolutionary trail.17 In his supplementary theses, he claimed that "the real strength of the liberation movement is no longer confined to the narrow circle of bourgeois-democratic nationalists. In most of the colonies there already exist organised revolutionary parties."18 But Lenin did not share Roy's optimism in the Indian proletariat. He lacked Marx's faith in a "spontaneous" development of class-consciousness. He saw an essential difference between the proletariat and the socialist, i.e., the class-conscious proletariat. Two years earlier Lenin had written that "workers have to work in the factory as if on a chain gang and neither time nor possibility remain for them to become socialists."19 "Spontaneity" represented merely nonrational opposition to society, which might temporarily coincide with the interests of a class, but would in the long run oppose it. Lenin considered the development of genuine class-consciousness dependent upon party organization, discipline, and indoctrination. At the time of the Second World Congress, there was no Communist Party in India but only a few scattered revolutionary groups. Lenin is reported to have pointed out to Roy that it would take some time before the Indian proletariat and peasantry could be mobilized.20
Their differing assessment of the Indian situation resulted in contrasting attitudes toward nationalist movements. Lenin urged "temporary relations and even unions" with nationalist movements.21 Roy, with India undoubtedly in mind, spoke only in terms of "cooperation" with such movements. More distrustful of the national bourgeoisie than Lenin, he laid greater stress on the development of the Communist revolution than in supporting the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the colonies. In his theses he recommended a modified agrarian pTrogram of land reform and 18 "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions," inc. cit., p. 74. Roy later admitted his error. He wrote that he gradually came to the realization that the Indian proletariat were not only "weak numerically" but "formed but partially as a class" for "very few are consciously inclined toward communism. It is true that Roy's supplementary thesis, which states that of preventing industrial development in the colonies" had rest proletarian class "until recently,"27 is ambiguous on this po in I920 had rested on the assumption that India had already att ist development in which class interests were beginning to soli thesis, Roy attempted a Marxian analysis of Indian society under the title India in Transition in I922. A Russian versio as I92I.28 In his book he argued that as a result of the "spectacu industry during World War I, the Indian bourgeoisie was n larger share in the exploitation of the natural and human r that the British Government, in order to prevent the native b forces with the masses against their common enemy, was n placating the former by granting them larger concessions. But Roy argued, shared the British fear of mass revolt; though for the strength of the masses to win still further concessions compromise with their rulers and settle for less than complete was the basis of Roy's distrust of the national bourgeoisie.
The above interpretation of the Roy-Lenin debate is at v Whiting's account but also with that of Overstreet and Wi the latter authors, though it reflects a remarkable degree of p presents a highly valuable account of Communist activitie less decidedly short on interpretation. Moreover it appears tha engrossed in questioning Roy's motives for entering into the d they overlooked altogether the possibility that he might legitimate, theoretical considerations. In explanation of R several suggestions, the principal one being that his challenge c control of Communist affairs in India.31
In support of this proposition, it is argued that Virendranath leader of a group of Indian revolutionaries in Berlin called t Overstreet and Windmiller appear to have given considerable credence to this point of view, although in another context they warn that, because of Tagore's "strong bias against M. N. Roy together with some factual errors," his book "should be used with caution." 34 The authors fail to support the imputation regarding Roy's motives at the time of the Second World Congress. They were unable to establish any contact between Chattopadhyaya's group and the Communist International before October, IQ2o35-two months after the conclusion of the Second Congress. Moreover it was not until May, I92I that the delegation of the Berlin Revolutionary Committee arrived in Moscow. There is no evidence to suggest that at the time of the Second Congress Roy considered this group a potential rival. But even if this point were granted, it still would not appear plausible that Roy would have considered this group such a challenge to his authority that he would have been reduced to the drastic expedient of countering the thesis of the formidable Lenin with one that proposed a line of action more suitable to his own contacts in India.
Throughout the discussion of Roy runs a common thread of suspicion concerning Roy's motives. ITus we find it "quite possible" that Roy opposed the resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Communist International which called for direct contact between the Comintern and the "national emancipation movements" because he saw it "as a threat to his position, since it called for that direct contact with the colonial nationalist movement which he himself had been unable to attain."30 Yet earlier we 
